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On 11 November 2001, China finally acceded to the WTO in Doha,Qatar, at the 4th Ministerial Conference, which also launched thefirst negotiating round of the new trade body since its establish-
ment. As China is the largest country that has ever acceded to the WTO
since the formation of the new trade organization, many commentators
predicted that its accession would change the dynamics of the negotiations,
but they differed in their interpretations on how such change would affect
the multilateral trading system. Some viewed this in a more positive light
by pointing out that the addition of China would strengthen the developing
country bloc and make the WTO a more balanced institution. Others, how-
ever, were not so optimistic. Instead, they argued that the Chinese accession
would upset the existing power structure of the WTO and make it more dif-
ficult to conduct negotiations and reach decisions.
Now in its tenth year of WTO Membership, how has China changed the
dynamics in the global trade negotiations? In this paper, I will try to answer
this question by reviewing China’s record in the Doha Round so far. I will
also offer possible explanations to China’s choice of particular negotiation
approaches, and conclude with some thoughts on China’s behaviour in fu-
ture negotiations.
The silent player
Joining the WTO at the Ministerial Conference that also launched the new
round was both a blessing and curse for China: on the one hand, China was
able to participate in the new round as a full member since the very begin-
ning; on the other hand, as a new member, China did not have time to pre-
pare for a more effective participation in the round, which turned out to be
not only the biggest, but also the longest and most difficult in the history
of the multilateral trading system.
In the beginning phase of the Doha Round, which is also known as the
Doha Development Agenda (DDA), China took a rather cautious approach.
While it submitted its first negotiating proposal as early as six months after
its accession, most of its earlier years in the WTO were spent observing the
negotiations rather than making active interventions. Most of the time, the
Chinese delegates would sit quietly in the negotiating room and take notes.
On the rare occasion that they took the floor, they usually just recited word-
by-word from pre-prepared notes and refrained from interacting with other
delegations.
There are several reasons for China’s reticence:
The recently-acceded member argument
Having been under the spotlight for 15 years in one of the longest ac-
cession negotiations (1) in the history of the GATT/WTO, the first expla-
nation for China’s low profile in public in the DDA is that the Chinese
government wanted some quiet breathing space to digest and implement
its heavy accession commitments. Indeed, China’s concessions on both
trade in goods and services greatly exceeded those of other WTO Mem-
bers, most of which have not changed since the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round. For example, Mattoo notes that China’s services com-
mitments are generally higher than other WTO Members in terms of both
the width of coverage and the depth of market-opening. Indeed, he
praises China’s commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) as “the most radical services reform program negotiated
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1. China’s dubious honour of being the WTO Members with the longest accession process has been
overtaken by Russia, which finally acceded to the WTO in 2011 after 18 years of accession nego-
tiation.
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in the WTO.” (2) This observation is shared by Lardy, who noted in his study
of China’s accession package that China’s commitments “far surpass
those made by founding members of the WTO and, in some cases, go be-
yond those made by countries that have joined the organization since
its founding in 1995.” (3)
Because of its substantial accession commitments, China has been arguing
that it, along with other “Recently Acceded Members (RAMs),” should not
be required to make the same level of concessions as the founding WTO
Members. (4) As the flip side of this strategy, China also tries to refrain from
making aggressive demands in the negotiation and keeps a low profile in
general to avoid unwanted attention from the other players.
To be fair, many WTO Members were initially sympathetic to the call for
special treatment for RAMs. For this reason, the Hong Kong Ministerial Dec-
laration explicitly stated that “[w]e recognize the special situation of re-
cently-acceded Members who have undertaken extensive market access
commitments at the time of accession. This situation will be taken into ac-
count in the negotiations.” (5) Indeed, had the DDA been concluded accord-
ing to the original schedule, it is not unlikely that China could have avoided
making substantial concessions on agriculture or Non-Agricultural Market
Access (NAMA) by hiding under the RAM label.
Unfortunately, however, as the Doha Round drags on, fewer members are
willing to give a “free ride” to members such as China that acceded a decade
ago. Moreover, the US and EU face increasing pressures: on the one hand,
their negotiating partners ask them to make more concessions; on the other
hand, vocal domestic constituencies (such as labour and farmer groups) have
been calling for their governments to seek more inroads into foreign markets
without giving access to their own domestic markets. Thus, they need to find
another scapegoat to divert part of the attention. What could be a better
target than China — the economic superpower on rapid rise? Thus, starting
from 2006, the US and EU have been pushing China from both sides. For ex-
ample, the US has repeatedly urged China, as the biggest beneficiary of the
multilateral trading system, to take more responsibilities at the WTO. (6)
Similarly, the EU has argued that China should be required to make contri-
butions just like other WTO Members. (7) While the US and EU use ambiguous
terms such as “leadership” to describe such “responsibilities” and “contribu-
tions,” a careful reading between the lines of their messages reveals that
what the US and EU have in mind is really asking China to provide more con-
cessions in key areas such as agriculture, NAMA, and services so that they
can have a better report card to show to their domestic stakeholders.
While China fought hard to avoid making new concessions by being recog-
nised as a RAM, it seems that China has lost the battle. According to the
latest negotiating drafts, the prevailing consensus seems to be that flexibility
will be extended mostly to small, low-income RAMs and “very recently ac-
ceded Members,” i.e., those that acceded to the WTO after the Doha Round
was launched. (8)
Lack of expertise
As a new member, China was not familiar with the rules of game. This is
the case for both the substantive rules as well as the procedural rules. Re-
garding the substantive rules, while most important rules have been com-
piled in the Secretariat publication entitled The Legal Texts: The Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (9) there are also nu-
merous GATT protocols, decisions, and other legal instruments that are not
available in a readily-accessible format. (10) On top of those, as noted by the
Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, (11) there are many panel
reports adopted during the GATT era, which, as “an important part of the
GATT acquis […] create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and,
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dis-
pute.” (12) In addition, in line with the tradition of “constructive ambiguity,”
many WTO rules are drafted in such a way that they are difficult to interpret
for any member, let alone newer ones. For new members, it is a major chal-
lenge to understand these legal rules.
Compared with the substantive rules, the procedural rules of the WTO are
even more difficult for new Members to decipher. While Articles IX and X
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement) pro-
vide a set of elaborate rules for the voting requirements for various deci-
sions, formal voting has been rare in the history of the GATT and WTO. (13)
In practice, most if not all decisions are made by “consensus.” But what is
“consensus”? According to the footnote to Article IX(1) of the WTO Agree-
ment, consensus is defined as the situation where “no Member, present at
the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision.” However, such cryptic explanation offers little help to the unini-
tiated. Ironically, that is probably the reason why the consensus rule is pre-
ferred over the clearly defined and easily understood rules, such as
two-thirds or three-fourths majority. To make it even more hopeless, even
the consensus rule itself is of little use in reality, as it applies to decision-
making in formal meetings, which unfortunately is not where most decisions
are made at the WTO. As acknowledged by the WTO Secretariat,
[i]mportant breakthroughs are rarely made in formal meetings of
[WTO] bodies, least of all in the higher level councils. Since decisions
are made by consensus, without voting, informal consultations within
the WTO play a vital role in bringing a vastly diverse membership
round to an agreement. (14)
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Thus, the only way to acquire essential negotiating skills such as agenda-
setting and coalition-building is through actual participation in the real work
of the WTO.
Unfortunately, as China did not become a formal member until six years
after the WTO was formed, it faced a rather steep learning curve. In this re-
gard, the 30 years of experience China had already acquired as a member
of the UN at the time it joined the WTO were not of much help for two
reasons. First, the nature of trade negotiations is very different from the po-
litical grand-standing at the UN. As one WTO official observed: “The UN is
a talk-shop; the WTO is for getting real business done.” (15) Second, at the
UN, China has been a member of its key decision-making body — the Se-
curity Council — from the very beginning. In contrast, there is no such for-
mal institutional arrangement at the WTO. Also, the key players in the global
trade arena had been rather reluctant to grant China a seat at the table of
the informal negotiating groupings for fear of diluting their own power. (16)
While China has substantial trade volume, this alone has not guaranteed
China a position as a key player in WTO negotiations.
Similarly, the 15-year accession negotiation did not teach China much about
negotiating as a full member, as the nature of accession negotiation is very
different from that of normal negotiations in the WTO. The accession nego-
tiation is a one-way process: while every existing WTO Member can make
any request against the acceding member, the acceding member does not
have any say on the existing rules of the WTO and has to accept them on a
“take it or leave it” basis. In a way, the accession negotiation is easier to handle,
as the acceding country only has to worry about its defensive interests. In the
normal WTO negotiations, however, each member not only has to look after
its defensive interests, but also has to launch offensive requests against other
countries. This requires considerable skills in assessing a country’s own inter-
ests, coordinating positions among various domestic interests groups and dif-
ferent ministries, and formulating and executing its negotiating strategy, all
of which China lacked during its early years as a new WTO Member.
The power shift at the WTO
Since its beginning, the GATT had been largely a trans-Atlantic scheme,
where the most important initiatives and decisions were first brokered be-
tween the US and EU and then presented to the rest of the membership
for acceptance. Later, this arrangement was expanded to include two more
countries, i.e., Canada and Japan. Known as “the Quad” among the GATT
observers, they controlled the GATT during most of its history.
In the 1980s, things started to change. An early example of this is the
strong resistance of the developing countries to the launch of the Uruguay
Round. (17) After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment
of the WTO, the developing countries became even more assertive. Led by
India and Brazil, the developing countries fought hard against the launch of
a new round, as they believed that they received a bad bargain in the
Uruguay Round. The round was only launched in 2001 after the developed
countries agreed to make important concessions to developing countries.
These include, among others, the official recognition of the “utmost impor-
tance” (18) of implementation issues – the central demand of developing
countries – in the Doha Declarations, and the adoption of a separate Min-
isterial Declaration explicitly allowing developing countries the right to grant
compulsory licenses to deal with public health crises.
As the negotiations got under way, the power gradually shifted from the
Quad to the new G-4, i.e., US, EU, Brazil, and India, and then to the “Five In-
terested Parties” (FIPS), i.e., the G-4 plus Australia. This later expanded into
the G-6 with Japan back in the picture. However, China, the biggest devel-
oping country, had been conspicuously absent from the inner circle. In a
way, China behaved liked the proverbial elephant in the room. Notwith-
standing its enormous size, it chose to sit quietly in a dark corner, while the
other members also largely pretended not to notice its presence.
How could this happen? The reasons are two-fold:
First, during the early stages of the Doha Round, the negotiations focused
mostly on agriculture. This why the FIPS countries were selected, as each
had a strong interest in agriculture: the US was eager to open markets
abroad while shielding its subsidy programs to its farmers; the EU wished
to keep its subsidy program while maintaining the preferential deal it had
with its former colonies; Brazil and Australia were highly competitive pro-
ducers of many agricultural products in the world with strong interests in
pushing open foreign markets as leaders of the Cairns Group; while India
was most interested in protecting its own vulnerable agriculture sector, the
sole livelihood of many of its millions of subsistence farmers. In contrast,
China was a net importer of agricultural products, and most of its agriculture
products were sold in its huge domestic market. Thus, China did not have a
strong interest in the agricultural negotiations.
Second, at least for the first few years after its accession, China was pre-
occupied with discriminatory clauses tailored-made for China, which it re-
luctantly accepted as the price for its accession. They can be further divided
into two categories: (a) WTO-plus obligations, i.e., obligations that are be-
yond those normally required of WTO Members; and (b) WTO-minus rights,
i.e., rights that are below those generally enjoyed by WTO Members. WTO-
plus obligations include the obligation to translate all foreign trade laws
into one of the official languages of the WTO, a special transitional review
mechanism for the first ten years after China’s accession, and national treat-
ment to both foreign products and persons. The WTO-minus rights include
non-market economy status in antidumping investigations, alternative
benchmarks in subsidy and countervailing measures (SCM) investigations,
a special textile safeguard mechanism, and a transitional product-specific
safeguard mechanism.
As these provisions were specifically designed to soften the impact of
China’s WTO accession on other members, they have had a much more di-
rect impact on Chinese exports than general WTO rules applicable to other
members, at least during the transitional period. While the exact relationship
between China’s special provisions and the normal WTO rules is still subject
to debate, (19) most commentators would agree that the China-specific pro-
visions would take precedence in accordance with the principle of lex spe-
cialis derogat legi generali (a special rule prevails over a general rule). Thus,
at least until 2017 (before the expiration of these China-specific provisions),
China would regard the revision of these special provisions rather than the
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revision of the general WTO rules as a more urgent task. Unfortunately, re-
vising the China-specific accession provisions through the WTO negotiations
will be extremely hard, if not impossible. To start with, the WTO is ill-
equipped for this task. Among the WTO Agreements, none contains explicit
rules on how to revise the accession protocol. In practice, other than a few
isolated cases of minor revisions of accession commitments, (20) there has
been no precedent of comprehensive revision of accession terms for par-
ticular countries. Thus, if China were to insist on revising its accession pro-
visions, the default consensus rule would probably apply. As we have seen
from the history of the WTO, consensus among all WTO Members is ex-
tremely hard to come by — indeed, it is one of the reasons why the Doha
Round is taking so long. More importantly, most other WTO Members are
not interested in the idea of revising China’s terms of accessions. Further-
more, even assuming that China could somehow persuade other members
to accept its request to revise its accession commitments, it probably would
have to provide compensation to other members according to the current
rules on the renegotiation and modification of schedules. (21) Such compen-
sation would have to take the form of additional concessions to other mem-
bers beyond the commitments China made upon accession. However, as I
explained earlier, it is very unlikely that China would be willing to provide
such additional concessions.
Against this context, the recent calls by the US and EC for China to shoul-
der more responsibility and make more concessions in the Doha Round are
a bit ironic: on the one hand, the US and EC imposed these harsh conditions
in the accession negotiation and effectively denied China the normal mem-
bership status; (22) on the other hand, the US and EC now want China to be-
have like a normal WTO Member, or better still, to go beyond what normal
WTO Members would offer by taking up leadership responsibility. Until the
US and EC abandon this double-standard and start to treat China on a non-
discriminatory basis, why should China be expected to contribute to the
round above and beyond what is expected of a normal member?
While its interests differ from those of many developing countries, China
has decided, for political reasons, to align itself with the developing country
camp. Thus, in August 2003, when the major developing country camp, the
G-20, (23) was formed, China quickly jumped on board. While many observers
welcomed this as the beginning of China’s leadership role among developing
countries, they were soon disappointed to find a silent China at the Minis-
terial Conference in Cancun hiding behind Brazil and India rather than lead-
ing other developing countries. One obvious reason is the lack of experience
of Chinese diplomats. The less obvious reason, however, is probably more
relevant: as with most other groupings in the WTO, the G20 is an issue-spe-
cific group. Its main mandate is to pressure developed countries to remove
their domestic support and export subsidies on agriculture. However, as one
of the largest importers of many agricultural commodities such as wheat,
soybean, and cotton, China actually stood to lose out if the developing
countries were granted their wish: the removal of subsidies would certainly
raise international market prices of these products, and China would have
to pay more for its agricultural imports. Thus, China remained silent from
the Cancun Ministerial in 2003 through the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005.
In 2006, things started to change. After resisting the demands of devel-
oping countries for a long time, the US and EU started to show more flex-
ibility and moved closer to the targets of developing countries on
agricultural issues. For example, the EU finally agreed, during the Hong Kong
Ministerial, to eliminate its agricultural subsidies in 2013. At the same time,
the US also agreed to cut its trade-distorting farm subsidies from US$22.5
billion to US$17 billion per year. (24) Partly encouraged by the progress on
agriculture negotiations, partly to shift the blame from themselves to the
developing countries, the US and EU started to push for movement in an-
other key area: industrial tariffs (referred as NAMA). This completely turned
the table in the negotiations: in agricultural market access negotiations, the
developing countries tend to play the offensive role of demandeurs, while
the developed countries largely assume the defensive position as deman-
dees. In contrast, in non-agricultural market access negotiations, the devel-
oped countries are the demandeurs against developing countries. The reason
for this is that developed countries have, due to the five decades of trade
negotiations under the GATT, lowered their industrial tariffs to below 5 per-
cent on average, while developing countries have much higher levels of in-
dustrial tariffs, usually ranging from 20-30 percent on average.
China on the centre stage
At the meeting of the G-4 in Potsdam, Germany, in July 2007, the US and
EU asked India and Brazil to reduce their tariffs on manufactured goods in
exchange for the trans-Atlantic offers on agricultural products. Even though
China was not invited to the meeting, all fingers started to point to China
this time. For example, according to the Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim,
acceding to the requests presented by the US and EU would risk “deindus-
trialising Brazil” in key industrial sectors. (25) Instead, he argued that Brazil
needed to maintain its right to impose high tariffs on manufactured goods
so it would have “policy space for dealing with China.” Similarly, Indian Trade
Minister Kamal Nath was also reluctant to “pay for someone else’s ride,” as
China stands to reap most of the benefits of lowering industrial tariffs. (26)
While these statements are obviously motivated by self-interest, they
have also highlighted the unmistakable truth that China, as the largest ex-
porter of manufactured goods, will gain most from any NAMA package.
Therefore, after the Potsdam meeting, the US and EU started to push China
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into the centre of the negotiating stage. To carry out their strategy, they
employed both “carrots” and “sticks.” On the one hand, they argued that
China, with its phenomenal growth record, has been the biggest beneficiary
of the multilateral trading system. Moreover, China will reap huge gains from
a successful Doha Round. Thus, it is in China’s self-interest to make more
contributions. On the other hand, they kept pressuring China on specific
areas. For example, they accused China of providing the largest amount of
subsidy among WTO Members to its cotton farmers and asked China to
scrap its cotton subsidy. (27) On NAMA, they asked China to lower tariffs in
specific sectors that are of interests to the US, such as industrial machinery,
chemicals, and electronics. (28)
In summary, they called for China to “take more responsibility” in the mul-
tilateral trading system. Such responsibility took the form of the coveted
membership in the core decision-making group of the WTO, when China
was invited to join the G6 to form the G7 at the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial
in Geneva.
By then, however, China had become well-versed in the craft of trade ne-
gotiations. As noted by Dr. Zhang Xiangcheng, the former Director-General
of the Division on WTO Affairs of MOFCOM and current Deputy Permanent
Representative of China’s WTO mission, it is naive to simply draw its inter-
ests along developing country lines. (29) Instead, China should try to form al-
liances with different countries on an issue-by-issue basis. (30) It is hard to
blame China for being selfish, as many other developing countries do not
view China as a true friend, either. For example, in anticipation of the expi-
ration of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), a group of 47 devel-
oping countries led by Mauritius adopted the “Istanbul Declaration” in
mid-2004 petitioning the WTO to extend the ATC for another three years.
As justification for their request, they cited various alleged “trade distorting
practices” by China, which “have allowed China to drop prices for textile
and apparel products by as much as 75 percent, and have given China an
unassailable and unfair advantage in world markets for textiles and cloth-
ing.” Thus, unless the ATC were extended, “global textile and clothing trade
will be monopolized by a few countries such as China” and this would lead
to “massive job disruption and business bankruptcies in dozens of countries
dependant upon textile and clothing exports.” (31)
Thus, China started to adopt a practical approach to the negotiations. On
the one hand, as the largest exporter, China shares many interests with de-
veloped countries. One example is trade facilitation. While many developing
countries are against the inclusion of the issue, given its position as one of
the top exporters in the world, it is actually in China’s interest to push for
the inclusion of trade facilitation in the WTO framework to make the cus-
toms processes of its exporting destinations more efficient and cheaper. On
the other hand, as a country with a large low-income population, China also
sympathises with the concerns of many developing country members. This
is why China supports the demand by India that developing countries should
be entitled to a list of special products that will be exempted from tariff
cuts, as well as a special safeguard mechanism that can deal with a surge
in particular agricultural imports. As a country that straddles the North-
South spectrum, China is well positioned to be an “honest broker” among
developed and developing countries. In the words of Dr. Zhang, China should
play “a balancing, bridging, and constructive role” between developed and
developing countries.
One early example of China’s bridging role is its proposal at the 2005
Hong Kong Ministerial that the members should try to reap some early har-
vest of the negotiating results before the conclusion of a comprehensive
agreement. This proposal helped to maintain the momentum of negotia-
tions and pushed the negotiation forward. Occasionally, China has even been
willing to sacrifice some of its own interests to generate momentum for
the round. For example, in 2005, China voluntarily offered to provide duty-
free and quota-free market access to imports from Least Developed Coun-
tries (LDC), even though this is not a requirement for developing countries.
Of course, playing the bridging role does not necessarily mean that China
would always have to sacrifice its interests. While recognising that it has
special responsibilities as a large developing country, China resents being
singled out in the negotiations. Therefore, China has been consistently op-
posing efforts by developed countries and some developing countries to
differentiate among developing country members. Similarly, when the July
2008 meeting ran into impasse due to India’s refusal to give in on special
products and a special safeguard mechanism, China turned down the US
request for China to provide additional concessions on special products in
agriculture and sectoral negotiations on industrial goods. Part of the reason
was domestic political difficulties, but an equally important reason was that
China did not wish to be treated differently from India, which has rejected
US demands on these issues. (32)
At the end of the July 2008 meeting, the US started to accuse China of
breaking the deal. According to the US, “China wanted a seat at the big kids’
table,” “They got it, they agreed to the text, and now they are trying to walk
that text back.” (33) This prompted a rare angry retort from Mr. Sun Zhenyu,
the Chinese Ambassador to the WTO:
We have tried very hard to contribute to the success of the round. It
is a little bit surprised that at this time the US started this finger
pointing. I am surprised because they are now talking about cotton,
sugar, rice of China as it seems that we are not going to make any
efforts in the Round. Let me explain what China has contributed in
the round.
Because of our accession negotiations, our tariff in agriculture on av-
erage is 15.2 % and bound at this level, which is lower than the av-
erage of European Union, lower than Canada, lower than Japan, lower
than quite a number of other developed countries on average. But
on that basis, we are committed in this round to cut further down
our tariffs – the applied tariffs deeply. And in NAMA, our average
tariff rate is 9, bound at that level. And in this round, we will cut about
30 % in applied level. So we are making contributions of 50 % of the
total developing countries in terms of applied rate cut. So that is our
contribution.
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If you consider what the contributions that developed countries are
going to make, in OTDS the US is spending $7 to 8 billion this year
or last year, maybe a little bit more to 10 billion, but they are offering
$14.5 billion with a lot of policy space for themselves. And in their
tariff cut in agriculture, they are protecting their sensitivities through
sensitive products while they are saying “well even if we have sensi-
tive products for 5 or 4% of our tariff lines, we will have TRQ expan-
sions”. But they can never expand their TRQ to the level of China’s
TRQ quantities. In our case, our TRQ is 9 million tons for wheat, 7
million tons for corn, 5 million tons for rice. How about your quota,
even after the expansion they will never pass half a million tons.
Where is the new market access to the developed countries?
In NAMA, they are using erosion trying to cover their sensitivities,
keeping their tariff peaks in textiles and garments for another 10
years. They will cover all their sensitivities through various measures
while they are asking China to participate in sectors where we have
great sensitivities, particularly in chemicals, in electronics, in machin-
ery. (34)
The Chinese proposals: Quantity and quality
Given the substantial obstacles China faced at the beginning, its perform-
ance in trade negotiations to date has been quite satisfactory. While no in-
dicator can accurately quantify a country’s negotiating prowess, the number
of submissions made in the negotiations can serve as a useful proxy. China
did not make any submission in the Doha Round until its proposal on fish-
eries subsidies on 20 June 2002. By February 2005, China had made more
than ten submissions. The number further jumped to 67 in December 2007.
By the time of the July 2008 meeting, China had made more than 100 sub-
missions. (35) Judging from the rapidly increasing number of submissions,
China has been learning very fast.
Measured on the number of proposals submitted, China is one of the most
active members of the round. According to a study (36) based on the official
records of the WTO in 2003, China made a total of 29 written submissions
to the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiary bodies, the Minis-
terial Conference at Doha, and the working groups on the four Singapore
issues, making it the most active developing country participant and the
fourth most active among all WTO Members in the Doha Round.
However, numbers alone only tell part of the story. Most of the proposals
by China focus on either the procedural issues or the special and differential
treatment for developing countries and do not touch on the substance of
the negotiations.
One reason for this is China’s lack of experience in multilateral trade ne-
gotiations, while the other reason is China’s awkward position on the sub-
stantive issues. As both the largest exporter in the world and a country with
millions still struggling on the poverty line, China often finds it hard to define
its own interests. For example, along with other developing countries, China
has been asking the developed countries to liberalise agricultural trade. At
the same time, China also feels the need to protect its highly vulnerable do-
mestic agricultural sector. The only way to protect both interests is through
the adoption of a double-standard, which in the WTO is achieved through
special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries.
Another example of conflict of interests is in the area of trade remedies,
where China is both the biggest victim and a major user. Take antidumping
measures for example: as China has been the favourite target of antidump-
ing investigations and actions for many years, we would think that China
has an incentive to push for stricter disciplines on antidumping in the Doha
Round. On the other hand, as one of the major users of antidumping actions
in recent years, it also seems right for China to argue for more discretion to
be given to the investigating authorities. Two other factors further compli-
cate the picture: first, as noted by Messerlin, China is much more targeted
by developing countries, especially if the number of antidumping actions is
adjusted for trade size, i.e., the average number of cases by each country
per thousand USD of exports from China to that country. (37) However, as I
noted above, it is politically awkward for China to confront developing coun-
tries. Second, because China is not treated as a market economy in an-
tidumping investigations, it does not matter much if the general rules under
the Antidumping Agreement are improved or not, unless, of course, China
argues for clarification of the rules on the treatment of non-market
economies in the Antidumping Agreement. But this is going to be a difficult
task for two reasons: first, as very few countries are in the non-market econ-
omy club, most WTO Members would not be sympathetic to China’s re-
quest; second, even if the relevant rules in the main Antidumping Agreement
were revised, it is unclear whether China would benefit from this at all, as
the China-specific provision is regulated by the Accession Protocol, which
legally speaking is an entirely different agreement from the Antidumping
Agreement.
Concluding thoughts
As we can see from the analysis above, during its first decade in the WTO,
China has gradually moved from the periphery of DDA negotiations to be-
come one of the key players of the round. China did not seek this key player
status. Even though it submitted many proposals in the negotiations, it
chose to stay out of the spotlight, as it did not wish to shoulder commit-
ments beyond its accession concessions.
However, because of its considerable economic clout and significant trade
volume, China was pushed onto centre stage by the other key players. In
the view of the author, this move was warranted. As history has shown, no
international institutions can survive for long without the support of the
key players. As the biggest emerging power in the world today, China de-
serves a seat at the big-boys’ table. On the other hand, granting China a
formal role in global trade governance also suits the interests of the other
members and the multilateral trading system as a whole: if China were de-
nied the chance to play the game that everyone else has been playing, it
might well decide to make its own game, probably to the detriment of other
WTO Members. This is a mistake no one can afford to make.
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Article
In contrast, those advocating for China to assume the leadership position
among developing countries have to be disappointed. To start with, the
world today is so different from the world of the 60s and 70s, when the line
between developed and developing countries was much clearer. Further-
more, due to its unique economic and trade profile, China shares much
fewer similarities with the average developing country than with developed
countries. Indeed, by some accounts, China has always been the largest
economy on earth by accounting for a quarter of the world GDP over the
past two millennia. (38) Thus, for China’s own interests as well as those of
other developing countries, it is probably better for everyone that China be
treated as what it is rather than pretending to be a member of the devel-
oping country camp.
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